ABSTRACT In recent years, information technology has become a focus of attention. All hardware, software, and communication technologies are growing rapidly. Nowadays, we can't live without technology. We use technology anywhere and anytime, and enjoy the convenience of technology. In particular, all kinds of network services and applications. These communication technologies and services constitute the concept of cloud computing. Cloud computing involves virtualization of service resources on the network; the entire service resources include scheduling, management, maintenance, and so on, which are carried out by specialized personnel. The goal of cloud computing is enabling users to use virtual resource pools maximally and handle large-scale computing problems anytime and anywhere via the network. Robotics is one of the rapidly developing technologies. Although there are numerous research teams working on cloud robots, research on cloud robot systems is still in its infancy and many problems have not yet been considered, such as the issues of robot privatization and communication security. Therefore, we propose a robot cloud service system and focus on four crucial issues: cloud platform central control, robot intelligence technology, robot privatization, and communication security. Finally, we use BAN logic to prove that the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication and user anonymity. The proposed scheme can also defend against several kinds of attacks, like eavesdropping attack, impersonation attack, parallel session attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay attack.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
With the rapid development of information and communication technology, the computational modes of computer systems have changed greatly. Cloud computing has become a ubiquitous technology for Internet users. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined the Cloud as ''a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable resources (e.g., servers, storage, networks, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.'' Cloud computing involves virtualization of service resources on the network. The entire service resources include scheduling, management, maintenance, etc., which are carried out by specialized personnel [1] - [4] . The goal of cloud computing is to enable users to use virtual resource pools maximally and handle large-scale computing problems anytime and anywhere via the network. However, cloud computing is only the application of the network environment; its service resources are virtual resources in the cyber world. It still needs a kind of middleware device that connects the cyber and physical worlds. Finally, the service will be able to serve people conveniently [5] - [8] .
Another rapidly developing technology is robotics. The study of mobile robots began in the late 1960s; Nilssen [9] of Stanford Research Institute developed an autonomous mobile robot named Shakey. However, a single robot has very limited computing power and storage space. With independent robotics, it is difficult to achieve rich functions and strong learning ability; therefore, robotics needs some external resources to assist them, for example, connecting a robot to an external computer. In recent years, both academia and industry have contributed to cloud robot-related research [10] - [12] . In order to meet the demand for physical world services, Du et al. [13] proposed robot cloud architecture. Their proposed scheme integrates robotics and cloud computing technologies in the concept of RaaS (Robot as a Service). The goal of their scheme is to create a synthetic system to strengthen the interactions between the physical and cyber worlds. Robot clouds are not only connections between the physical and cyber worlds, but also an important way to enhance the performance of robots [14] , [15] .
Although numerous research teams working on cloud robots, the research on cloud robot systems is still in its infancy; many problems still need to be considered now, such as robot privatization and communication security [16] , [17] . In Du et al.'s scheme, the service robots (SRs) are distributed in all parts of the physical world and controlled by the robots cloud center. At the same time, the service robot (SR) can communicate with other parts of the system; they are also required to interact with each other. Therefore, in the current cloud and robots application field, the following issues are part of a trend: a central cloud platform control, robot intelligence technology, robot privatization, and communication security. [18] Robotics and smart homes are becoming more and more popular; many users will be adopting these kinds of solutions. An amount of tasks and data will need to be dealt with by the system. Cloud platform technology can solve the problem well and enhance the scalability of the system.
1) CLOUD PLATFORM CONTROL CENTRALLY
2) ROBOT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY [19] In our proposed scheme, the robots are distributed everywhere. In the process of carrying out their tasks, the robots will encounter a variety of scenarios, so they should be able to perceive changes in their surroundings and react differently.
3) ROBOT PRIVATIZATION [20] With the development of robotics and smart homes, the need for ever more home robots and remote control has become a hot issue. The cloud robot system is fully capable of handling requests from users through the cloud control center. In order to protect the privacy of users' dedicated robots and diversity of services, our system specifies the scope of activities for dedicated robots and shared robots, and enables specific interactions between them.
4) COMMUNICATION SECURITY [21]
An authentication mechanism is designed for our system; it is also the main contribution of our proposed scheme. When a message is transmitted between different roles, it is necessary to protect the security of the transmission process [22] - [24] . In the previous proposed robot cloud articles, there was no related authentication scheme of communication security, especially the authentication between the SRs. This article targets the above four issues in designing a robot cloud service system which protects user privacy, and its efficacy can be verified.
B. BAN LOGIC MODEL
The BAN logic model [25] , [26] is used to prove the correctness of a scheme. In the field of information security, BAN logic is used to prove whether mutual authentication is achieved or not in many certification agreement papers. The notation of BAN logic is described as follows:
P| ≡ X : P believes X , or P would be entitled to believe X. P X : P sees X . Someone has sent a message containing X to P, who can read and repeat X. P| ∼ X : P once said X . P at some time sent a message including X. P| ⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X . P is an authority on X and should be trusted on this matter.
The formula X is fresh; that is, X has not been sent in a message at any time before the current run of the protocol. P K ↔ Q : P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate. P S ⇔ Q : The formula S is a secret known only to P and Q and possibly to principals trusted by them.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces the proposed robot cloud service system. Section 3 describes the proposed authentication protocol. Security analyses of this protocol are presented in Section 4. Section 5 offers the conclusions of this paper.
II. ROBOT CLOUD SERVICE SYSTEM
This section presents a detailed introduction on the robot cloud service system, and describes the communication process between the entities in the proposed scheme. The robot cloud service system architecture is shown in Figure 1 . The system architecture consists of four parties: Users, Robot Cloud Center (RCC), Cloud Robot Host (CRH), and Service Robot (SR), from top to bottom. We describe the responsibilities of each party as follows.
(1) User (U): Users are people who use cloud robots. Generally, users communicate with robot cloud centers through their mobile devices, such as smartphones. (2) Robot Cloud Center (RCC): The RCC is the core of the whole architecture. The RCC is responsible for receiving requests sent by users, performing all the calculations, storing data, and issuing instructions to cloud robot hosts. (3) Cloud Robot Host (CRH): CRHs are centralized management and control by The RCC. CRHs are believed to be reliable for the RCC. There are two types of CRHs: dedicated robot hosts and shared robot hosts. Each type generally has more than one host. These hosts serve as intermediaries for cloud control centers and the SR, and they are responsible for scheduling the SR to complete the tasks according to the instructions of the cloud and each group has a master host. The SRs have their own typical characteristics and will finish different tasks respectively. The SR are also divided into two categories: dedicated SR (DSR) and shared SR (SSR). DSRs belong to the dedicated user; they can only be used by the owner, and only serve in a user's specified area. On the contrary, the SRs are for public use; their tasks are assigned by their master CRH, and they cannot get into the specified area of any user. The SRs are usually deployed in different physical locations; that is the reason why cloud services must be designed in the scheme.
In order to describe the implementation process of the scheme in detail, we use a scenario to illustrate the cloud robots services.
(1) The user registers with the RCC by using his/her identity information via smartphone. 
III. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
It is essential that every entity needs to authenticate with each other in our proposed scheme. There are three authentication processes that need to be implemented: U-RCC authentication, RCC-CRH-SR authentication, and SR-SR authentication.
In this section, we propose a reasonable authentication protocol consisting of three phases: initialization phase, registration phase, and authentication phase. The notations used in our protocol are as follows.
ID x
the identity of x PW x strong password of x pb x the public key of x pr x the private key of x r i the ith random number generated during the authentication process R x secret random number generated and stored by x 56490 VOLUME 6, 2018
C. the i th task information generated by RCC SK x−y the temporary session key between x and y -----> the secure channel
In the initialization phase, all entities should be initialized. The RCC, Users, CRHs and SR generate their own pairs of public and private keys, and then store their own keys in the memory, respectively.
B. REGISTRATION PHASE
In the registration phase, a user who wants to use the RCC services should register with the RCC and obtain a legal identity. The user's dedicated SR and other publically shared SR should also register with the RCC during this phase.
1) USER REGISTRATION PHASE
The following steps are performed during user registration phase; the process is depicted in Figure 2 .
Step 1: The user sets up his/her identification ID U and a strong password PW U ; the user then generates a random number R U and a timestamp t 1 . The user computes the masked password p 1 .
The user sends the messages with p 1 , t 1 and ID U to the RCC via a secure channel as a registration request.
Step 2: After receiving the request from the user, the RCC generates timestamp t 2 and checks if the timestamps t 2 − t 1 < t firstly. If the timestamp t 1 is found to be abnormal, the request will be dismissed. The RCC generates a random number R RCC and computes the user's and its authentication parameters M U −RCC and M RCC−U .
The RCC sends the messages with M RCC−U and t 2 to the user via a secure channel as a registration feedback.
Step 3: The user generates timestamp t 3 and checks if the timestamps t 3 − t 2 < t. The user saves the parameters M RCC−U and R U . The RCC saves the parameters M U −RCC and R RCC in the storage.
2) SERVICE ROBOT REGISTRATION PHASE
The RCC will register the SR's information and add the SR with the corresponding CRH during the SR registration. The following steps are performed during Service Robot registration phase; the processes are described in Figure 3 .
Step 1: The SR generates a random number R SR and a timestamp t 4 ; the SR then computes the hash value p 2 .
The SR sends the messages with p 2 , t 4 and ID SR to the RCC via a secure channel as a registration request.
Step 2: After receiving the request from the SR, the RCC generates timestamp t 5 and checks if the timestamps t 5 − t 4 < t. The RCC computes the SR's secret ID UID SR and the hash value p 3 by using pr RCC and R RCC . This UID SR only is known by the RCC and its own host CRH.
The RCC sends the messages with p 2 , p 3 , t 5 and UID SR to the CRH via a secure channel.
Step 3: The CRH generates timestamp t 6 and checks if the timestamps t 6 − t 5 < t; the CRH then generates a random number R CRH . The CRH computes the SR's authentication parameter M SR−CRH and the RCC's authentication parameter M RCC−CRH .
The CRH computes its authentication parameters M CRH −RCC and M CRH −SR as follows: 
C. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In order to enjoy the services provided by the RCC, the user needs to send an authentication request message to the RCC and complete the authentication among the RCC, User, CRH, and SR. During this phase, three authentication processes need to be completed. They are U-RCC authentication, RCC-CRH-SR authentication, and SR-SR authentication.
1) U-RCC AUTHENTICATION PHASE
U-RCC authentication means the authentication between the User and the RCC using the information saved during registration. This phase completes the mutual authentication 56492 VOLUME 6, 2018 between the User and the RCC. The steps for U-RCC authentication are illustrated in Figure 4 .
Step 1: The user inputs his/her password PW * U and identification ID * U ; the user then generates a timestamp t 9 . The user computes two parameters p * 1 and p 4 as follows, and then encrypts parameter p * 1 by using the public key of the RCC.
The user sends the messages with c 1 , p 4 and t 9 via a public channel as an authentication request.
Step 2: After receiving the request from the user, the RCC generates timestamp t 10 , random number r 1 and checks if the timestamps t 10 − t 9 < t. The RCC decrypts parameter c 1 by using its private key pr RCC as follows, and computes
The RCC compares M * U −RCC and M U −RCC ; if they are not equal, the process will be terminated. The RCC then computes two parameters as follows:
The RCC generates certification cert RCC−U signed by the RCC and encrypts parameter M * RCC−U and cert RCC−U by using public key of the user.
The RCC saves the certification cert RCC−U and then sends the messages with c 2 and t 10 to the user via a public channel as an authentication feedback.
Step 3: The user generates timestamp t 11 and checks if the timestamps t 11 − t 10 < t. The user then decrypts parameter c 2 by using his/her own private key.
Compare M * RCC−U and M RCC−U ; if they are equal, the authentication is successful. Finally, the User saves the certification cert * RCC−U .
2) RCC-CRH-SR AUTHENTICATION PHASE
After making the task execution plan, the RCC initiates the authentication request to the associated Cloud Robot Hosts. At the same time, the CRHs also need to authenticate with the corresponding SR. Finally, the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase implements the mutual authentication among RCC, CRH and SR. The steps for RCC-CRH-SR authentication are presented in Figure 5 .
Step 1: The RCC generates a timestamp t 12 , and computes the two parameters: p * 3 and c 3 by using its public key, VOLUME 6, 2018 pb CRH to encrypt ID SR and save random number R RCC . The ID SR is the ID of the SR that needs to perform the current task.
The RCC sends the messages with c 3 , t 12 and p * 3 to the CRH via a public channel as an authentication request.
Step 2: After receiving the request from the RCC, the CRH generates timestamp t 13 and checks if the timestamps t 13 − t 12 < t.
The CRH then computes the authentication parameter M * RCC−CRH as follows.
The CRH compares M * RCC−CRH and M RCC−CRH . If they are equal, the CRH will initiate the authentication request to the corresponding SR. The CRH then gets the right SR's ID by decrypting parameter c 3 .
The CRH computes the authentication parameter M * CRH −SR and encrypts it by using the public key of the SR.
The CRH sends the messages with c 4 and t 13 to the SR via the public channel.
Step 3: After receiving the request from the CRH, the SR generates timestamp t 14 , random number r 2 and checks if the timestamps t 14 − t 13 < t. Then the SR uses the private key pr SR to decrypt c 4 as follows:
The SR compares M * CRH −SR and the saved parameter M CRH −SR ,; the SR computes the hash value p * 2 using its ID SR and R SR and generates certification cert SR−CRH signed by the SR.
Then the SR encrypts the p * 2 and cert SR−CRH using the public key of the CRH.
The SR saves the certification cert SR−CRH and sends the messages with c 5 and t 14 to the CRH.
Step 4: After receiving the message from the SR, the CRH generates timestamp t 15 , random number r 3 and checks if the timestamps t 15 − t 14 < t. The SR decrypts parameter c 5 by using the CRH's private key and computes authentication parameter
The SR compares M * SR−CRH and M SR−CRH ; then the SR computes parameter p 5 using its private key pr CRH , saved random number R CRH and secret UID * SR , and generates certification cert CRH −RCC signed by the CRH.
Then the CRH encrypts the p 5 and cert CRH −RCC using the public key of the RCC.
The CRH saves certifications cert * SR−CRH and cert CRH −RCC , and then sends the messages with c 6 and t 15 to the RCC.
Step 5: After receiving the message from the CRH, the RCC generates timestamp t 16 
The RCC compares M * CRH −RCC and M CRH −RCC . If they are equal, the authentication is successful. Finally, the RCC saves the certification cert * CRH −RCC .
3) SR-SR AUTHENTICATION PHASE
If user A wants to propose a task request, she/he will first authenticate with the RCC. After receiving the request, the RCC generates a task execution plan and creates confidential task information and a temporary session key SK 1−2 as a key for interactive authentication among the SRs. Then the system completes series of authentications among RCC, CRHs and SRs which are related to the work, which is RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase. The steps for SR-SR authentication are described in Figure 6 .
Step 
Step 3: SR 1 initiates the authentication request to SR 2 , it generates a timestamp t 17 and computes the parameter c 9 through encrypting the task information TI 1 using session key SK 1−2 . Step 
IV. SCHEME ANALYSIS A. PROPERTY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the four points to show our scheme's properties.
1) CLOUD PLATFORM CENTRAL CONTROL
In the proposed scheme, we use the cloud computing platform as a centralized control center. The cloud platform has great computing power and storage capacity; thus, it can effectively complete the operation and management of the whole large system. So, even if more users or robots join the system, the proposed scheme still has enough ability to run properly. Therefore, the scheme is highly extensible.
2) ROBOT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY
In our proposed scheme, robots are used to perform the users' tasks and they connect the cyber world and physical world. The robots can not only perform tasks according to the system commands, but can also react intelligently depending on environment in the scheme. The robots have certain computational and storage abilities, and they can complete mutual authentications with their own CRHs and other robots. Various sensor devices are installed on the robots, so they can sense the surrounding parameters such as humidity, temperature, objects, direction, and so on.
3) ROBOT PRIVATIZATION
In Du et al.'s scheme [13] , robots are public and can go anywhere according to the arrangement of the Cloud Center. In our scheme, the SRs are divided two categories: dedicated SR (DSR) and shared SR (SSR). We also specify the scope of activities for the DSR and SSR. The purpose of this design is to protect the privacy of users' dedicated robots and diversity of services. According to the development of robotics and smart home, it is easy to foresee that more and more home robots will be chosen, and remote control will become more popular.
4) COMMUNICATION SECURITY
An authentication mechanism is designed for our system and it's also the main contribution of our proposed scheme. In the previous proposed robot cloud articles, there was no related authentication method of communication security, especially authentication between SRs. Next, we discuss security issues and several known attacks in section 4.B, and discuss computation cost, communication performance, and feature comparison in section 4.C.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we focus on the following security issues to verify whether or not our scheme conforms to these requirements.
1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
We use BAN logic to prove that our scheme achieves mutual authentication between different parties in each phase. These authentication analyses are divided into the following three parts: U-RCC authentication, RCC-CRH-SR authentication, and SR-SR authentication.
(1) U-RCC authentication
The objective of the U-RCC authentication phase is to prove that the trustfulness is established between the User U and the robot cloud center RCC.
According to the U-RCC authentication phase, the BAN logic is used to make an idealized form as follows:
We formulate the following assumptions to analyze the proposed scheme:
On the basis of the assumptions and the rules of BAN logic, the main proof of the U-RCC authentication phase is shown as follows: a. The RCC authenticates user U.
Through M1 and the seeing rule, we deduce:
Through A2 and the freshness rule, we deduce:
Through (Statement 1), A4 and the message meaning rule, we deduce:
, and thenonce verification rule, we deduce:
Through (Statement 4) and the belief rule, we deduce: 
On the basis of the assumptions and the rules of BAN logic, the main proof of the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase is shown as follows: a. 
, and thenonce verification rule, we deduce: Through M6 and the seeing rule, we deduce:
Through A14 and the freshness rule, we deduce:
Through (Statement 33), A16 and the message meaning rule, we deduce: 
The progress of the authentication method is similar to U-RCC authentication. Therefore, we complete mutual authentication among RCC, CRH and SR.
(3) SR-SR authentication
This phase is the highlight of our scheme. The main goal of the scheme is to authenticate the certificate establishment between different SRs.
G17:
According to the SR-SR authentication phase, the BAN logic is used to make an idealized form as follows:
On the basis of the assumptions and the rules of BAN logic, the main proof of the SR-SR authentication phase is shown as follows: a. Service robot SR 2 authenticates Service robot SR 1 .
Through M7 and the seeing rule, we deduce:
Through A22 and the freshness rule, we deduce:
Through (Statement 41), A24 and the message meaning rule, we deduce:
), and thenonce verification rule, we deduce:
Through (Statement 44) and the belief rule, we deduce: 
Through (Statement 50) and the belief rule, we deduce:
↔ SR 2 (Statement 51) Through (Statement 51), A25 and the jurisdiction rule, we deduce:
In accordance with (Statement 46) and (Statement 52), we prove service robot SR 2 and service robot SR 1 authenticate each other. Furthermore, we are also able to prove that the trustfulness is established between service robot SR 2 and service robot SR 1 in the SR-SR authentication phase.
SRs authenticate each other by checking TI * 1 = TI 1 and TI * 2 = TI 2 . The session key SK A−B is the key point in the authentication process, and the session key is generated by the RCC and sent to the SR after encryption, using their public keys, so only the right SR can get the correct session key. According to the above descriptions, mutual authentication is ensured in our scheme.
2) USER ANONYMITY
In our scheme, the User's identity is never transmitted in clear text via a public channel. The parameters p 4 
). An attacker cannot get the ID * U , because the attacker does not know the private key of the RCC, and the p * 1 is not transmitted via the public channel. On the other hand, for the parameters
, an attacker cannot obtain the ID * U due to the attacker does not know the private key pr u of the User and M * RCC−U is protected by the one-way hash function H (). At the same time, the password and saved secret random number of the User are also protected by the one-way hash function H(), and the hash value is not transmitted directly via a public channel. For the above reasons, our scheme ensures the User's anonymity and the security of the User's authentication information.
3) EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
An attacker may try to collect all transmitted messages and record each parameter between User (U) and the RCC. The attacker gets the message (c 1 , p 4 , t 9 ) from U to the RCC VOLUME 6, 2018 and the message (c 2 , t 10 ) from the RCC to U through eavesdropping in the U-RCC authentication phase. Because all the core information is encrypted with the public key or performed with a one-way hash function, the attacker cannot obtain or modify the User's or RCC's related authentication information. The RCC-CRH-SR authentication is similar. In SR-SR authentication phase, although an attacker can get the transmitted messages between SRs, because the privacy of the session key SK A−B is unknown to the attacker, she/he cannot get the core information. Therefore, the privacy of private key and session key are preserved; hence, the scheme protects against an eavesdropping attack.
4) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In our scheme, an attacker may impersonate an SR or a CRH, if she/he is successful, the topology of whole system and design of task planning will be affected. We assume that the attacker wants to impersonate the CRH. First, the attacker should capture four transmitted messages (c 3 , t 12 , p * 3 ), (c 4 , t 13 ), (c 5 , t 14 ) , and (c 6 , t 15 ) during the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase. Then, the attacker should know which SR will be sent the message next. The attacker does not know the private key of the CRH and the UID * SR , so the attacker cannot send the next message to the right SR. On the other hand, whether it is the CRH or SR, they cannot initiate authentication, so it is impossible for an attacker to impersonate a CRH or SR.
5) PARALLEL SESSION ATTACK
When an attacker wants to intercept the authentication message (c 1 , p 4 , t 9 ) during the U-RCC authentication phase and wants to initiate a parallel session attack, the attacker will fail due to the secret random number R U is used for authentication, and this parameter is saved in the User's device during registration. The User, RCC and CRH all have their own secret random numbers saved and used for authentication, so it is hard for the attacker to initiate a parallel session attack.
6) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
An attacker may intercept the transmitted messages (c 1 , p 4 , t 9 ) during the U-RCC authentication phase. If the attacker wants to pass the authentication, he/she must correctly compute c 1 and
, the attacker needs to guess the strong password PW * U , the secret random number R U , and the ID * U . But the probability of successfully guessing is very low. In the same way, if an attacker wants to modify the request message (c 3 , t 12 , p * 3 ) during the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase, he/she must at least successfully guess the secret random number R RCC and private key of RCC. Obviously, this probability is also very low. Therefore, our scheme is secure against man-in-the-middle attack.
7) REPLAY ATTACK
When an attacker tries to block the transmitted messages (c 1 , p 4 , t 9 ) during the U-RCC authentication phase or (c 3 , t 12 , p * 3 ) during the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase by trying to initiate a new session with the fake messages, the progress will be terminated or rejected. Our proposed scheme verifies the timestamps during every transmission; therefore, our proposed scheme is secure against replay attack.
8) PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
In our proposed scheme, attacker A cannot complete the authentication with RCC successfully only through guessing someone's password. Suppose the attacker has guessed the user's ID and password, the attacker need to compute two parameters p * 1 using R U , and then encrypts parameter p * 1 by using the public key of the RCC. And if attacker gets the right feedback from RCC, attacker has to decrypt parameter c 2 by using user's private key. But the user's saved random number R U , the public key of RCC and the private key of user are unknown for attacker. So, there are three crucial issues to be solved by attacker except the ID and password, and these values are all very difficult to guess successfully.
9) FORWARD SECRECY AND KNOWN-KEY ATTACK
In our scheme, the previously generated session keys and certifications are still secure though the private keys of RCC and users. Because all of certifications are generated depend on temporary random numbers during the authentication phases, and the session keys among SRs are generated by unknown mission information. So, the attacker cannot obtain previously generated certifications, session keys and complex correspondence based on the private key of someone. Therefore, our scheme can provide forward secrecy and defend the known-key attack.
10) DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
When role A wants to establish the communication with role B, it is necessary to confirm the legitimacy of each other before they can communicate with each other. An attacker could counterfeit legitimate role A, and sent messages to the role B continuously. Even if the identity cannot be verified successfully, it will still make the system unable to provide services to other legitimate users. In our proposed scheme, timestamps are added during the transmitted messages. If the timestamp exceeds the upper limit, the system will directly reject the received message without subsequent message verification. Therefore, our proposed scheme can prevent denial of service attack effectively.
C. DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyze the computation cost and communication performance. We also make a feature comparison of our scheme and Du et al.'s scheme.
1) COMPUTATION COST
The computation costs of our scheme is shown in Table 1 .
In Table 1 , the computation cost for the User, RCC, CRH, and SR in each phase of our scheme are analyzed. We take the highest computation cost in the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase for example. One hash function operation, two comparison operations, two encryption operations, and one exclusive-or operation are required by a RCC. Four hash function operations, four comparison operations, five encryption operations, and one exclusive-or operation are required by a CRH. One hash function operation, two comparison operations, and three encryption operations are required by a SR. It is an appropriate computation cost and complexity in our proposed scheme. efficiency of our scheme during the transaction process of each phase. It is assumed that 1024 bits are required for a RSA operation, 256 bits are required for an AES operation, and 256 bits are required for a hash function operation, while 80 bits are required for other messages with exclusiveor operation. We take the RCC-CRH-SR authentication phase for example. Four RSA messages, one hash function message, and four other messages are required during VOLUME 6, 2018 the transmission. So that 1024 * 4+256 * 1+80 * 4 = 4672 bits are required. It is assumed that the peak transmission rate of 14 Mbps for the 3.5 G environment, all these messages only take 0.338 ms to be transferred. When in the 4 G environment of 100 Mbps peak transmission rate, the transmission time for all these messages is reduced to 0.047 ms (ITU 2016). For the above analysis, our scheme is efficient. Table 3 shows the feature comparison of our scheme and Du et al.'s scheme [13] .
2) COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE

3) FEATURE COMPARISON
V. CONCLUSIONS
With the rapid development of information and communication technology, the computational modes of computer systems have greatly changed. These communication technologies and services constitute the concept of cloud computing. The goal of cloud computing is to enable users to use virtual resource pools maximally and handle largescale computing problems anytime and anywhere via the network. Another rapidly developing technology is robotics; it has remained a hot research issue in recent years. Integrating the cloud computing and robots has generated valuable research. Although there are numerous research teams working on cloud robots, research on cloud robot systems is still in its infancy and many problems have not yet been considered, such as robot privatization and the communication security, especially authentication between SRs. Therefore, we proposed a robot cloud service system which includes U-RCC authentication, RCC-CRH-SR authentication, and SR-SR authentication. We used BAN logic to prove the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication, and user anonymity. The proposed scheme can also defend against several kinds of attacks, like eavesdropping attack, impersonation attack, parallel session attack, man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, password guessing attack, forward secrecy and known-key attack, and denial of service attack.
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